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‘The sun is shining, but I don’t believe that it is.’ As G.E. Moore famously noted, there’s
something wrong with believing this.1 It has, however, proved surprisingly difficult to say
exactly what is wrong.2 The proposition has a quality akin to inconsistency; yet, clearly,
it could be true.
The problem lends itself, I shall argue, to an illuminating formal analysis. Apart from
the pioneering work of Hintikka (1962), not a great deal has been done in this area.
Sorensen (1988, p. 23) writes ‘ interest in doxastic logic has dwindled, so much so that
it is not feasible to erect a convincing analysis [of Moore’s paradox] on this kind of
foundation.’3 But I shall argue that, contrary to Sorensen’s view, doxastic logic is a fruitful
way to approach the problem raised by Moore. Below I investigate the logics obtained by
formalizing various introspection principles. A particular system of logic, not previously
studied, which I call K5c, will emerge as key. Moreover, this logic can be justified, on a
plausible view of what is wrong with Moorean beliefs, in terms solely of the avoidance
of false belief. Since this can be done without appealing to introspection, this last notion
turns out to be less relevant to the Moorean problem than first appears.
1 Preliminaries
The language of the logics to be considered is a propositional language, together with an
operator B.The intended interpretation of Bp is that p is believed by some (fixed) rational
agent. Sometimes we will write ◽ instead of B when this is convenient—typically when
considering the logic in the context of modal logics in general. It is sometimes useful to
use the dual operator ⋄; the dual of Bmay be written C (‘doxastic possibility’).
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We assume that the logic includes as theorems all classical propositional tautologies.
We also assume the axiom
(K) B(p→ q)→ (Bp→Bq)
which states that belief is closed under believed material implication.
A further basic assumption is the rule of necessitation
(Nec) From ⊢ p derive ⊢Bp,
which here can be thought of as formalizing the principle that the agent believes all the
(doxastic) logical truths.
From (Nec) and (K) it follows that belief is also closed under (formal) entailment: for
if Bp and p⊢ q, then ⊢ p→ q, whence ⊢B(p→ q) by (Nec), and hence Bq by (K).
The logics considered will therefore all be extensions of the standard normal modal
system K, and can be handled by standard Kripke models. There is already a significant
degree of idealization encoded in these axioms; for example, they entail that the agent
believes arbitrarily long propositional tautologies. Worries about the finite capacities of
the human mind, however, seem misplaced. The project is to analyze in what respect
someone with a Moorean belief is irrational, and the approach is through constructing
a theory of rationality, thought of as the principles obeyed by an ideally rational agent.
A human disbelieving a long tautology is committing a sin against rationality, a
pardonable one but a sin nonetheless.
Another natural axiom for our doxastic logic expresses that the agent does not believe
any contradictions:
Bp → ¬B¬p
that is,
Bp→ Cp
or in more familiar modal terms
(D) ◽ p→ ⋄ p.
The logics we consider will, in fact, all be extensions of KD.4
As a further preliminary we make the now standard distinction (see, e.g., Green and
Williams 2007, p. 5) between the commissiveMoore paradox
The sun is shining and I believe that it is not shining
and the omissiveMoore paradox
The sun is shining and it’s not the case that I believe it is shining.
In the formalism these become take the form of the schemas
(CMP) a∧B¬a
and
(OMP) a∧¬Ba.
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2 Introspection
It is intuitively apparent that an agentwith sufficient introspective powers is immune from
Moore’s paradox.5 Let us explore this more carefully.
It would be a mistake to expect even an ideal agent to obey the axiom
(T) Bp→ p;
while this axiom is standard in many applications of modal logic, here it would require
that the agent is infallible, that is, they have no false beliefs.This is clearly too strong; even
an ideally rational agent may, for example, be the victim of misleading evidence. (Still less
would it be appropriate to require the converse axiom p→Bp, which is the belief version
of omniscience.)
There are some spheres, however, in which it might be thought an ideal agent should
not err. In particular, such an agent might be thought to have special access to their own
beliefs, in such a way that they believe something if, and only if, they actually do believe
it. This suggests the axioms
(4) Bp→BBp
and
(4c) BBp→Bp.
(4) is sometimes known as positive introspection; it is of course a familiar axiom in
modal logic. The converse (4c) is less familiar as it is a consequence, indeed an instance,
of T; it might be called positive belief infallibility.6
There are introspective powers one could desire of an agent which are not captured by
these axioms. For example, an agent can obey (4), yet fail to have a belief without realizing
that they do so. This suggests the axiom of negative introspection
(5) ¬Bp→B¬Bp.
There is also its converse, negative belief infallibility
(5c) B¬Bp→¬Bp.
In box-diamond form (5) is ¬◽ p→◽¬◽ p which on replacing p by ¬ p takes the
familiar form
⋄p→ ◽ ⋄ p.
We shall have more to say about (5c) below.7
We can show that an agent8 who is positively introspective and infallible—that is, who
satisfies (4) and (4c)—will be immune fromMoore paradoxical beliefs.
For the omissive case, suppose (for reductio)
B
(
p ∧ ¬Bp
)
.
Then
Bp ∧ B¬Bp
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by closure under entailment. By (4)
Bp→ BBp;
hence
BBp ∧ B¬Bp
which violates (D).
For the commissive case: suppose
B
(
p ∧ B¬p
)
.
Then
Bp ∧ BB¬p.
But by (4c),
BB¬p→ B¬p.
Thus
Bp ∧ B¬p
once again violating (D).
Can this simple observation be regarded as a solution of Moore’s paradox? That is,
should we simply make the diagnosis that what is wrong with a Moore-paradoxical
believer is that they fail to be sufficiently introspective or are fallible about their own
beliefs? This does not seem entirely satisfactory. For one thing, having a Moorean belief
seems to be a failure of rationality. But it is unclearwhy aweakness in introspective powers
should be irrational. A deficiency in this area seems, on the face of it, to be akin to having
(say) bad eyesight rather than to believing a contradiction.
In addition, the proofs above leave it open that some weaker principles might suffice
to avoidMoore, perhaps ones with a better claim to be rationality principles.That is what
we shall now investigate.
3 Some systems of doxastic logic
Howweak can a doxastic logic be and still guarantee immunity fromMoore’s paradoxes?
We note first that KD is too weak; we can construct a KD-model in which both an
omissive and a commissive Moorean belief is held. Consider the model below. InW2 we
have p,¬◽ p,◽¬ p all true, and hence in W1, we have that both ◽ (p∧¬◽ p) (omissive
Moorean belief) and ◽ (p∧◽¬ p) (commissive Moorean belief) are true. Note that since
R is serial this is a KD-model.
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The considerations in the previous section show, in effect, that adding the axioms (4)
and (4c) to KD—to form what Chellas (1980), p. 142 calls K4!—suffices to prevent the
paradox. But might a weaker logic be enough?
A convenient way to approach this problem is as follows. One with an commissive
Moorean paradoxical belief satisfies
B (a ∧ B¬a)
and hence
Ba ∧ BB¬a
for some a. We can simply outlaw such beliefs by adopting an axiom (schema)—call it
‘no commissive Moore’ or (Ncm) for short—of the form
Bp→ ¬BB¬p.
With a little manipulation of negations this can be written in box-diamond form as
(Ncm) ◽ p→ ⋄ ⋄ p.
It is immediately apparent that the weakest strengthening of KD which is immune
from commissive Moore will be the logic KDNcm obtained by simply adding this as an
axiom schema; and in general a (KD) logic will avoid commissive Moore iff it contains
KDNcm.
Similarly omissive Moore can be avoided by adding the axiom schema
Bp → ¬B¬Bp
or in box-diamond terms
(Nom) ◽ p→ ⋄◽ p.
What of these axioms? As far as I know, no-one has previously given a specific name
to the axiom I have labeled (Ncm).9 (Nom), on the other hand, can be re-written in dual
form
◽ ⋄ p → ⋄p
and is therefore equivalent to (5c) above, ‘negative belief infallibility.’ The key to avoid-
ing the omissive Moore paradox, therefore, is not to be ‘peculiar’ in the sense of
Smullyan.
We now have five principles, or axioms, on the table: (4), (4c), (5), (5c) and (Ncm). By
adding one or a combination of them to KD, we obtain a number of alternative doxastic
logics, which we can compare in strength. When doing so, it is convenient to know, for
each axiom, a constraint on the accessibility relation R of a standard Kripke model such
that the axiom is valid is the class ofmodels satisfying that constraint. It is familiar that (4)
corresponds to transitivity and (5) to Euclideanness (and (D) to serialness: ∀ x ∃ yRxy).
There are standard methods allowing one to determine a constraint on R for a large class
of candidate axioms (see Lemmon 1977, p. 52, 67). Using these we obtain the following:
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Axiom Constraint on R
4 ◽ p→◽◽ p ∀ u∀ v ∀w((Ruv∧Rvw)→Ruw) (transitivity)
4c ◽◽ p→◽ p ∀ u∀ v(Ruv→∃w(Ruw∧Rwv)) (density)
5 ⋄ p→◽ ⋄ p ∀ u∀ v ∀w((Ruv∧Ruw)→Rvw) (Euclideanness)
5c=Nom ◽ ⋄ p→ ⋄ p ∀ u∃ v(Ruv∧∀w(Rvw→Ruw))
Ncm ◽ p→ ⋄ ⋄ p ∀ u∃ v(Ruv∧∃w(Ruw∧Rwv))
We are now in a position to investigate the relationships between these axioms and the
various logics obtained by adding some subset of them to KD.
For example, we can prove that (5) (with (D)) entails (4c). For an instance of (D)
is ◽◽ p→ ⋄◽ p. (5) (contraposed from the version above) is ⋄◽ p→◽ p; putting these
together yields (4c): ◽◽ p→◽ p.
Each of (4c) and (5c) entails (D) (in K). This is unsurprising given the constraints on
R in the table; demonstrating it proof-theoretically can be done as follows. We will take
the case of (5c): intuitively the idea is that if (D) fails, everything is necessary, while from
(5c) one can derive that something is possible (and hence its negation is not necessary).
Suppose for reductio some instance of (D) fails: then for some a, ◽a and ◽¬a. Hence
◽ (a ∧ ¬a).
Since
⊢ (a ∧ ¬a) → ¬◽
(
p→ p
)
(where ⊢ denotes derivability in K), we have
⊢ ◽
(
(a ∧ ¬a) → ¬◽
(
p→ p
))
by (Nec), whence by (K)
⊢ ◽ (a ∧ ¬a) → ◽¬◽
(
p → p
)
.
Hence on our original assumption,
◽¬◽
(
p → p
)
,
that is
(⋆) ¬ ⋄◽ (p→ p).
But also
⊢
(
p→ p
)
,
so by (Nec)
⊢ ◽
(
p→ p
)
.
An instance of (5c) (contraposed) is
◽
(
p → p
)
→ ⋄◽
(
p → p
)
;
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hence
⋄◽
(
p→ p
)
by modus ponens, contradicting (⋆). An exactly similar proof can be used to derive (D)
from (4c).
Countermodels to demonstrate independence are fairly easy to construct, using the
constraints on R as a guide. As illustration, to demonstrate that KD4 does not contain
K4c we need a serial model which is transitive but not dense. One isomorphic to less than
on the natural numbers will do: on letting p be true at ‘world 1’ of the model and false at
worlds 2 onwards, we obtain ◽◽ p true and ◽ p false at world 0, as required.
In a similar way, one can construct a model satisfying the constraint for (5c) but not
full transitivity to demonstrate that (5c) does not entail (4).
I will not give full details of the proof, but it turns out that there are 10 distinct doxastic
logics that can be obtained by adding a subset of the 5 axioms to KD, with the following
diagram illustrating relative strength:
Here we write, as above, (4!) for the conjunction of (4) and (4c) (and similarly with
(5!)). Since, as noted above, each of (4c) and (5c) entail (D), logics are labeled as K4c
rather than KD4c, etc, since the D would be redundant.
Once one has the diagram in place, a number of observations are possible.
1. K5c (that is, KDNom) contains KDNcm; thus avoiding an omissive Moore paradox
guarantees avoiding a commissive one. This, indeed, should come as no surprise.
A (KD) agent who has a commissive Moorean belief satisfies B(p∧B¬ p), hence
BB¬ p. Since the agent not only satisfies the D-axiom but believes that they do so
(by (Nec)), we have B(B¬ p→¬Bp) and hence BB¬ p→B¬Bp, and finally B¬Bp
bymodus ponens.Thus a commissiveMoore gives rise to a corresponding omissive
one, which is the contraposition of the result stated above.
2. The converse, however, does not hold; one may avoid all commissive Moorean
paradoxes yet be liable to omissive ones.
3. The informal argument in the previous section showed that K4! sufficed to avoid
the paradoxes; we now see that this can be weakened to KD4.10
4. As a particular application to a position that has appeared in the literature: Heal
(1994, p. 21) attempted to solve Moore’s paradox using a version of the positive
infallibility principleBBp→Bp (4c). Green andWilliams (2007, p. 17) point out that
this solves only the commissive paradox, leaving the omissive paradox unsolved.
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This can be read off immediately from the diagram; the logic K4c contains the logic
KDNcm, but not the logic KDNom=K5c.
More generally, we see that any of the logics KD45, K5!, K4!, K4c5c, KD4 and K5c
suffice to avoid both Moore paradoxes, while KD5, K4c, KDNcm and KD do not. The
fact that adding positive introspection—axiom (4)—to KD avoids the paradoxes might
suggest that this is the appropriate rationality principle to adopt. However, the fact that
a strictly weaker logic, K5c, suffices to solve the paradoxes throws this logic into the
limelight. Somewhat surprisingly, it is negative infallibility—that if you believe you
don’t believe something, you really don’t believe it—that emerges as the key rationality
principle here.
4 K5c and avoiding false belief
The problem posed by Moore’s paradox, as outlined above, is to explain what is wrong
with believing a Moorean proposition, in the light of the fact that these propositions are
consistent. I have so far held back from endorsing a particular solution to this, and the
project of identifying K5c as the weakest logic that avoids Moorean belief is, I think,
worthwhile whatever one’s view. However, a plausible line of thought on this turns out
to give further support to K5c.
The following idea has appeared several times in the literature and seems to me to be,
at the very least, along the right lines (see, e.g., Deutscher 1967, p. 184; Williams 1994,
p. 165). The suggestion is that, although Moorean propositions are consistent (can be
true), they cannot be true if believed. It is quite easy to see that this applies to propositions
of both the forms (OMP) and (CMP). For the omissive case, it is clear that B(p∧¬Bp)),
together with closure, yields Bp which is inconsistent with the believed proposition; and
as observed above, one with a (CMP) belief must in any case also have the corresponding
(OMP) belief. It is a simple matter, if desired, to formalize this in KD.
This seems to give an attractive answer as to why we should regard avoiding Moorean
beliefs as a principle of rationality. For one who fails to avoid them is doomed as a matter
of logic (given other weak assumptions about their rationality as encoded in KD) to
possess at least one false belief.
In as far as K5c is (just) strong enough to guarantee their avoidance, therefore,
this supports the logic as correctly embodying rationality principles. One might worry,
however, whether (OMP) and (CMP) exhaust the possibilities here. Might there not be
some other schema, distinct from both of these, which nevertheless has a similar effect,
of producing inconsistency when combined with belief? And perhaps K5c is powerless
to prevent such beliefs?
Happily we can prove that, were such alternative schemas to be proposed, K5c is
already strong enough to avoid them.
Let us say a is Moorean if (according to the minimal logic KD) it is consistent, but
cannot be true if believed. Formally, a is Moorean if
i. ⊢ KD¬a
ii. ⊢ KD ¬ (Ba∧ a).
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Then we have the following
Theorem 1 Suppose a is Moorean. A (KD)-logic L satisfies ⊢ L ¬Ba iff L contains K5c.
Proof. We first show that if L contains K5c and a is Moorean, then ⊢ L ¬Ba. For
convenience, let us write B as ◽.
Suppose for reductio that ◽a. Since a is Moorean,
⊢L ¬ (◽a ∧ a) ,
hence
⊢L a → ¬◽a.
Hence, by (Nec),
⊢L ◽ (a → ¬◽a)
whence by (K),
⊢L ◽a → ◽¬◽a.
By modus ponens, we can therefore derive from our assumption ◽a
◽¬◽a,
that is,
◽⋄¬a.
Since L contains K5c,
⊢L ◽⋄¬a → ⋄¬a
since the formula is just an instance of the (5c) axiom. Hence
⋄¬a
that is,
¬◽a
and hence
◽a ∧ ¬◽a.
We have thus reduced the assumption ◽a to a contradiction, and can conclude by
reductio
⊢L ¬◽a
as required.
For the opposite direction, suppose L does not contain (5c). Then there will be
an L-model in which there is an omissive Moorean belief, that is, a model in which
B(p∧¬Bp) holds. As proved above, OMP isMoorean. ◽
This theorem is really the central result of this paper: informally, K5c is exactly strong
enough to outlaw beliefs which, though consistent, cannot be true if believed.How should
we regard the axiom (5c)? It was introduced above as one of a family of introspection
principles, but as I mentioned earlier, it seems dubious to regard these as rationality
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principles. The approach in this section suggests an alternative way to look at (5c): it is
simply a self-standing principle of rationality, justified not by the introspective powers
of our ideal agent but by the imperative to avoid false belief. Introspection has, after all,
nothing to do with avoiding Moorean belief.
The line I am taking here is foreshadowed byHintikka (1962). Hintikka’s doxastic logic
includes the (4) axiom, but he explicitly repudiates (pp. 53–7) using introspection to
justify his rationality principles. His attempted justification, however, is problematic.The
key axiom which yields the proof of (4) is his principle (A.CBB*) (p. 24), a special case of
which is: if a,Ba⊨ b, then Ba⊨Bb.11 (4) follows easily by putting b=Ba.
Can (A.CBB*) be justified without appealing to introspection? Hintikka attempts
(p. 25) to argue for it by citing an omissiveMoore paradox case, and stating that it seems to
him that to hold such beliefs is ‘clearly inconsistent.’ But even if we grant him this appeal
to brute intuition, as is by now clear this will not motivate (4) (or (A.CBB*)) but only the
weaker (5c).
5 Accuracy
In this section I show that K5c has yet further desirable properties. Milne (1993),
pp. 501–2 introduces the following properties of a doxastic logic:
i. Positive accuracy: if ⊢Ba then ⊢ a. (Note we are guaranteed the converse of this
since we’re assuming the rule of necessitation.)
ii. Negative accuracy: if ⊢¬Ba then ⊢¬a.
Intuitively, positive accuracy means that the only beliefs held as a matter of logic are
ones which are already (doxastic) logic truths; a violation, as Milne puts it, ‘commits a
rational individual to believing propositions that are, in the logic’s own terms, at best
accidental’ (p. 501). Similarly, a violation of negative accuracy means that the logic
commits the agent to disbelieving a proposition that is consistent (by the lights of that very
logic). Milne describes each of positive and negative accuracy as an ‘adequacy condition,’
noting (p. 517) that KD is both positively and negatively accurate but (p. 520) that KD45
is neither, and concludes that KD45 is ‘much too strong.’
In view of the approach of this paper, and in particular the last section, it should come
as no surprise that I do not regard negative accuracy as a virtue for a doxastic logic.
The lesson of Moore’s paradox, indeed, is exactly that it can sometimes be irrational to
believe consistent propositions. The negative accuracy of KD precisely shows that it is
too weak to avoid Moore-paradoxical belief. In fact all the Moore-avoiding logics will
fail negative accuracy.12
Positive accuracy, however, does seem to be desirable, and it is unclear what could
justify a violation. It is interesting to examine the proof that KD45 fails to have positive
accuracy. The reason is that the formula
(U) B(Bp→ p)
is theorem of KD45 but of course the T axiom Bp→ p is not. Smullyan (1988, p. 78) calls
an agent who satisfies (U) conceited. Here as elsewhere, conceit is not an attractive feature:
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a conceited agent believes herself to have no false beliefs, but the kind of ideal agent we
are modeling is fallible, and optimally should be aware of this.
Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, conceit is a consequence of negative introspection:
the (U) axiom follows from (5) alone. For a violation of (U) means that, for some a,
⋄ (◽a∧¬a); hence ⋄◽a∧ ⋄¬a, that is, ⋄◽a∧¬◽a, violating (5). In fact it is quite easy to
show that (U) is strictly intermediate in strength between (5) and (4c) (see Chellas 1980,
pp. 92, 140–1,167). It follows that the same proof can show any (KD) logic containing (5)
but not (T) will fail to be positively accurate: thus KD5, K5! and KD45 are all ruled out
as too strong on this basis.
Ideally, then, we would like our logic to be positively but not negatively accurate.
Happily, K5c meets these conditions.
Theorem 2 K5c is positively but not negatively accurate.
Proof. First, K5c is not negatively accurate, as above. For if a= (p∧¬Bp), then
⊢ K5c ¬Ba but⊢¬a (for¬a is equivalent to p→Bp, which is not a theorem even of KD45,
indeed not even of S5).
For the positive accuracy, we use the method of ‘safe extensions’ (see Lemmon 1977,
p. 27 or Chellas 1980, p. 99). We will prove that if ⊨ K5c ◽a then ⊨ K5ca; the result then
follows by the standard soundness and completeness theorems.
The proof proceeds by contraposition. Suppose that it is not the case that ⊨ K5ca; thus
there is a K5c model in which, at some world W, a is false. We use this to construct a
model in which, at some world, ◽a is also false. Enlarge the model by adding a new world
W′ and extending the accessibility relation so that it holds (i) betweenW′ andW, and (ii)
betweenW′ and any worldWi such that RWWi in the original model (and is otherwise
exactly as before). By the ‘safe extension theorem’ Lemmon (1977, p. 27), a is still false at
W in the new model. And ◽a is therefore false atW′.
It remains to check that the new model is still a K5c model. We can show easily that R
satisfies the constraint given above, ∀ u∃ v(Ruv∧∀w(Rvw→Ruw)). For u=W′, taking
v to beW will do; the construction of R ensures the condition holds. And if u is any other
worldWi, the condition holds in the new model exactly as it did in the old one, since the
accessibility relation between worlds other thanW′ is exactly as it was in the old model.
Hence, as required, not-⊨ K5ca implies not-⊨ K5c ◽a; contraposing we have
⊨ K5c ◽a⇒⊨ K5ca as required. ◽
We can give a variant of this proof to show that some other logics, notably KD4, are
on a par with K5c as far as accuracy is concerned; but as we saw earlier, these are strictly
stronger than is needed to avoid Moorean propositions.
6 Conclusion
The last few sections suggest that the previously neglected logic K5c has quite a lot going
for it: it is exactly strong enough to avoid not only the standard Moorean paradoxes,
both omissive and commissive versions, but also any other propositions that share with
these the feature that they cannot be true if believed.Thus, if avoidingMoore-paradoxical
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beliefs is a matter of rationality, K5c embodies exactly the rationality principles required.
And it has exactly the accuracy properties that we should hope for from a doxastic logic.
Is K5c the One True Doxastic Logic? This may be to claim too much. One can
reasonably worry both that it is too strong and that it is too weak. On the first, even the
K-axiommay be doubted, even for an idealized agent, for reasons concerning the preface
paradox and such matters: one might have good evidence for each of a large number
of propositions, yet be reluctant to believe their conjunction, on the grounds that one
is probably wrong about at least one of them.13 On the other side, there are Moore-like
phenomena, not falling under the definition given above, which K5c is too weak to avoid.
For example, Sorensen (2000) discusses some iterated Moore-like propositions, such as
‘It’s raining, but I don’t believe that I believe it’s raining.’This is not Moorean in the sense
defined above since it can be true even if believed, yet intuitively believing it seems to
carry an irrationality akin to that of the original Moore.
An extension of the analysis given in this paper is an obvious avenue to explore for
both these problems, but that will have to wait another day. I hope, though, that my
investigations here might convince some that—contra Sorensen’s pessimistic view cited
in the introduction—doxastic logic does have a useful role to play.14
Notes
1 Or asserting it, but I shall not consider that here.
2 See, for example, the introduction to Green and Williams (2007) for a survey of attempts.
3 Of course, a great deal of work has been done on the logic of belief change, and some of that
has touched on Moore’s paradox: see for example Van Benthem (2004) and Segerberg (2006).
But the focus of these papers is on the problems that Moore paradoxes can create when
updating in dynamic logics. As far as I know, the simple approach suggested in the present
paper has not previously been considered.
4 Milne (1993), p. 517 suggests KD as an ‘appealing’ minimal doxastic logic.
5 For a treatment of Moore which puts introspection centre-stage, see for example Shoemaker
(1995).
6 The entertaining Smullyan (1988) (and the earlier paper Smullyan 1986) attaches memorable
labels to some of these properties: agents obeying (4) and (4c) are called normal and stable
respectively.
7 Smullyan (1988, p. 81) calls one who violates it peculiar.
8 As stated above, we suppose that the agent satisfies the axioms K and D.
9 It is, though, an instance of a well-studied schema: in the terminology of Lemmon (1977,
p. 51) it is an instance of the schema G′ withm= p= 0, n= 1, q= 2.
10 Indeed, Hintikka (1962) uses a logic equivalent to KD4 in giving his solution to Moore.
11 Hintikka puts his axioms in terms of consistency, but it is easier to see what is going on if one
contraposes and puts them in terms of entailment.
12 Milne has told me (in conversation) that he no longer regards negative accuracy as an
adequacy condition.
13 As an anonymous referee observes, the preface and lottery paradoxes also given reason to
doubt the principle that one should not hold a set of beliefs if at least one is guaranteed to be
false, and hence threaten to undermine the justification of K5c given in Section 4.
12 Thought (2015)
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Adam Rieger Moore’s Paradox, Introspection and Doxastic Logic
14 My thanks to David Bain, Bob Hale, Stephan Leuenberger, Peter Milne, Martin Smith and
two anonymous referees, and apologies to anyone I’ve left off this list by mistake. I began
thinking about the issues in this paper while I held an award (AH/H006230/1) from the
AHRC under their Research Leave scheme in the Autumn of 2010.
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